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TO :	жырх хххуххс JWD/GMM	VIA: RJWW	DATE OF REQUEST 11 January 1982
FROM :	JTC Joanne Callahan		SUSPENSE DATE
SUBJECT:	Upcoming HPSCI Hearing on Soviet Acti	ve Measures Rotu	m JI chas
NOTES	<u>/</u>		(31. 4)
Herb Romerstein has advised that Congressman John Ashbrook (R., OH), through a letter sent from Chairman Boland to Mr. Casey, will request a hearing on Soviet Active Measures directed against the U.S. Although no specific date has been mentioned, the Session may take place in early February. The Committee will probably propose that:  1. The DDO testify in closed session before HPSCI concerning			
Soviet Active Measures directed against the U.S., citing the nature of the threat and commenting on what the Administration and the Agency			
are doing about it. 25X1			
3. The FBI testify concerning Soviet Active Measures in the U.S.			
<ol> <li>An agreed upon, sanitized transcript of the hearings be sub- sequently published by the Committee.</li> </ol>			
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Some of the more liberal staffers, e.g., Diana LaVoy, have criticized the August 81 DDO IIM on Active Measures. While Ms. LaVoy may attempt to supply the Members with information to counter our position, her lack of expertise in this area will render her ineffective.

Enclosed are a copy of Diane LaVoy's remarks as well as a DDO memo outlining the Agency's involvement with HPSCI regarding Soviet Active Measures.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

August 27, 1981

SUBJECT: IIM, "Soviet Active Measures," August 1981

This IIN was drafted by the Covert Action Staff, under the auspices of the National Intelligence Council, and coordinated with NFAC and other community elements.

Although the subject is important, this IIM is at best sloppy. The major problem is that it makes broad and important assertions without indicating how it came to them.

For example, it asserts that "the Soviets are willing to accept embarassment" over the exposure of their covert actions, and that the Soviets believe that this exposure has not had much bad effect. How do we know these things? The IIM states that "active measures" policy is made at the highest levels of the Politburo; it is doubtful that we have such a clear insight at these levels.

A close reading suggests that much of the IIM is based on information from a single defector, described also as a KGB "active measures" specialist. Yet this fact is obscured in most of the references this source.

The definition of "active measures" is so broad as to blunt the focus of the IIM. On the one hand, "active measures" are described as "an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy" which is "poorly understood and infrequently countered systematically" — terms which liken it to covert action. On the other hand, it is defined to include virtually every instrument of Soviet foreign policy, from trade to diplomacy, and much of the activity described in the six case studies is overt.

There is no indication in the body of IIM of how the authors came to the conclusion that future Soviet activity would follow particular trends. The trends themselves sound reasonable as speculations. If they are little more than speculation, this should be made very clear. This section would seem to be particularly vulnerable to embellishment, either to reinforce or to contradict the views of those who credit the Soviets with being the driving force behind all leftist political parties, and peace, environmentalist, and human rights groups. According to the IIM, future trends include having "international fronts increasingly supplemented by...religious, "international fronts increasingly interest groups"; increased willingness to work with non-communist political parties; etc.

